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Commencing with a critique of codes of ethics based on the Statement of 
Principles of the International Federation of Social Work, we explore how a 
narrative approach to ethics might better serve the practice of social work. We 
argue that narrative both addresses some of the problems within current 
codes—such as their Western assumptions, lack of attention to the political role 
of the social worker, and the privileging of professional expertise—and aligns 
well with the values social work, being committed to social justice and 
diversity. Furthermore, we suggest that narrative, because it can operate at the 
individual, family, community, social, and discoursal levels can help us think 
ethically about how we construct narratives about, with, and for individual 
service users while remaining attentive to wider concerns of social justice. In so 
doing we are not seeking to construct a new code of ethics but to generate 
debate as to how social work ethics might be reconfigured. 
 
 
Social work, as with other professions, is guided by a code of 
ethics that claims to be in alignment with the purpose and values of the 
profession. The primary articulation of this is found in the Statement of 
Principles of the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW, 
2004) to which national associations, affiliated with the IFSW, are 
required to align their own codes of ethics. As a result, despite their 
differences, there is remarkable similarity between national codes of 
ethics. 
However, it is our contention that there are two fundamental 
misalignments—one philosophical and one practical—between social 
work’s espoused values and codes of ethics that are based on that of the 
International Federation of Social Workers. The philosophical 
misalignment lies between a commitment to respect “people’s right to 
make their own choices and decisions, irrespective of their values and life 
choices,” enabling them “to be empowered in all aspects of decisions and 
actions affecting their lives,” respecting “the ethnic and cultural diversity 
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of the societies in which they practise, taking account of the individual, 
family, group and community differences” (see IFSW, 2004) and the 
promotion of what is essentially a normative ethical framework rooted in 
Western philosophy. The practical misalignment lies in the attempt to 
corral ethical comportment by insisting on adherence to a set of 
pronouncements, a practice that removes ethical creativity and personal 
responsibility for the uniqueness of the ethical encounter. In this article 
we will first briefly summarise criticisms of social work codes of ethics 
and then move toward developing an alternative framework rooted in 
post-modernist philosophies founded on difference and realised through 
narrative understanding, processes, and practices. In so doing we are not 
attempting to substitute one code for another but hope to stimulate debate 





Criticism of social work codes of ethics is not new. Although 
many criticisms were raised prior to the revision of the International 
Federation of Social Workers’ International Declaration of Ethical 
Principles of Social Work in 2004, the revised code failed to address the 
concerns expressed. Consequently it continued to embody those failings 
and, over time, attracted further criticisms as the role of social work 
changed. We rehearse some of the criticisms here.  
First, there is a tendency towards viewing concepts as universal or 
unproblematic, noted by authors such as Gilbert (2009), Briskman (2001), 
and Briskman and Noble (1999). Examples of such universalization are 
found in Rhodes (1992) in her discussion of the concept of justice, and 
O’Leary, Tsui, and Ruch’s (2012) discussion on the boundaries of the 
social work relationship. Second is the fading relevance of a code of 
ethics when the nature of social work and its relationship to the State and 
service users has changed so drastically as to render the definition of 
social work found in such codes redundant (Petrie, 2009). Third, the 
deontological and utilitarian approaches to ethics embedded within the 
IFSW Statement of Principles are not international but Western and thus 
impose or privilege one cultural perspective over others, contrary to 
social work’s value commitments to diversity (see Azmi, 1997). Fourth, 
the codes of ethics are not consistently utilized in practice (see, for 
example, Millstein, 2000; Johns & Crockwell, 2009). Fifth, the reliance 
on Kantian philosophy, in discussing “respect for persons” is criticised by 
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Webb and McBeath (1989) as ignoring the political nature of the social 
worker’s relationship with service users. Finally is the inability to address 
the problems that arise when there is a difference between personal 
beliefs and professional values and principles (see Buila, 2010). 
We would further extend these criticisms in two ways: the reliance 
on principlism and the lack of a concept of personhood. With regard to 
the first of these, to the extent that the Code encompasses the principlist 
approach to ethics (as found in standard social work texts such as Banks, 
2006, and Parrott, 2006) they embody a peculiarly Western way of 
thinking about fundamental concepts such as the individual, autonomy, 
liberty, and equality (see Tan Alora & Lumitao, 2001, for a discussion of 
this in relation to bioethics and Wong, 2004, on the Confucian focus on 
harmony of the family and the community rather than individual 
interests). Similarly, there is some evidence to suggest that some groups 
of service users such as family carers of people living with dementia may 
find narrative ethics more pertinent than principle-based approaches (see 
Elliott, et al., 2009). Further, such an approach curtails ethical creativity 
and leads to the sterility and uniformity of approach complained of by 
Harris in his discussion of the principlist approach to bioethics (Harris, 
2003). In framing ethics as the application of pre-determined principles, 
such codes undermine the professional autonomy necessary to approach 
new and unique situations and individuals and the use of one’s authentic 
self in social work practice, as the only self that is allowed to be used is 
that bounded by the professional commitment to principlist, 
deontological, or utilitarian ethics. In other words, there is a conflict 
between the promotion of professional autonomy and a commitment to 
ethical heteronomy (see Baldwin, in press). 
Our second criticism arises from the fact that, while social work 
codes of ethics frequently refer to individuals and persons, there is no 
underlying conceptualisation of what it means to be a person or of moral 
personhood. This may seem rather too philosophical a criticism to be 
relevant to most, but our practice may depend on such—for example, 
Brock (1993) argues that people with severe dementia are no longer 
persons and this may justify more limited ethical obligations towards 
them and consequently, lessened treatment. A notion of personhood, we 
would argue, is thus essential to ethical action. 
Given that the revised code of ethics failed to address such issues, 
the criticisms are still highly pertinent and thus we suggest that the need 
to develop a more appropriate ethical framework for social work remains. 
The challenge for social work (and perhaps for other professions) is to 
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develop a framework for ethical reflection and action in such a way that it 
can deal with multiplicity and diversity (see, for example, Briskman, 
2001). If social work is to realise its values and principles it is essential, 
in our view, that it has an ethical framework that aligns philosophically 
and practically with those values and principles. In other words, it needs 
an ethical framework that focuses on a dynamic rather than essentialist 
Self, on difference and uniqueness rather than abstract homogeneity, on 
persons in relationship, on emergence and becoming rather than stasis, on 
ethical autonomy rather than heteronomy. We shall suggest in what 
follows that a strong narrative ethics can provide such a framework, 
exploring first existing uses of narrative in social work before turning to a 
narrative ethics.  
 
Narrative in Social Work 
 
In their review of narrative social work literature, Riessman and 
Quinney (2005) noted only a modest taking up of narrative ideas in the 
field of social work and while there was some literature on narrative as 
specific therapeutic intervention, creative writing responses by individual 
social workers, and narrative accounts of discrete cases, there was little in 
the way of narrative approaches to qualitative analysis. Only one mention 
of narrative and ethics is made in the review and this is an unreferenced 
statement that Quinney had noted: “narrative frameworks can honor 
social work values and ethics, by valuing time with and diversity among 
people” (p. 395). Since that time, there has been some movement in terms 
of narrative analysis (see Baldwin, 2011; Urek, 2005; Wells, 2011) and 
social work has, to some extent, embraced narrative as an approach to 
working with service users (see, for example, Abels and Abels, 2001 on 
narrative therapy; Schweitzer and Bruce, 2008, on reminiscence; and 
Shah and Argent, 2006, on life story work) but, with the exception of 
Wilks (2005), little with regard to the development of a narrative ethics 
for social work, a surprising absence given the fundamentally narrative 
nature of social work (see Parton & O’Byrne, 2000; Baldwin, in press). 
As Wilks (2005) states: “The stories that service users tell us [social 
workers] and our reinterpretations and retellings of them form the warp 
and weft of our working lives” (p. 1249). Add to this the plethora of 
institutional narratives which emerge in various documents across social 
work departments (see, for example, Pithouse and Atkinson, 1988; Hall, 
1997) and one is struck with the inescapability of narrative in social work. 
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Bearing in mind that social work is a narrative practice, there are 
nevertheless two distinct positions one can take on how narrative impacts 
daily activity: roughly categorized into “weak” and “strong” positions, 
each placing a different emphasis on the importance of narrative to 
human beings both individually and in relationship. The weaker view sees 
narrative as a valuable but essentially supplemental tool to other 
conceptual approaches to human understanding. In contrast, the strong 
position argues that our very lives are narratively constituted (see, for 
example, Bruner, 1987, 2006; Ricoeur, 1991; Schechtman, 1996). In this 
view, we do not merely retroactively assign a story to our experiences; 
instead, we engage in a “narratively constructed framework of identity” 
(Wilks, 2005, p. 1258). In terms of professional practice, the weak 
position uses narrative as a specific therapeutic intervention, a means to 
collect research data or material on which to develop theory, whereas the 
strong stance sees social work theory and practice as framed, shaped and 
guided by narrative in its understanding of the individual and 
interpersonal relationships, research methodology (see Hall, 1997; 
Baldwin, in press), and as we shall argue here, ethics. 
 
Envisioning a Narrative Ethics for Social Work 
 
As narrative approaches have increasingly become a serious part 
of other fields such as medicine, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and 
law, so too have various formulations of narrative ethics. In medicine 
particularly, these versions of narrative ethics have frequently arisen in 
challenge to the principlist model of bioethics, as greater and greater 
dissatisfaction with the limits of this model has been made known (see, 
for example, Charon and Montello, 2002; Nelson, 1997). Charon (2004), 
prominent in the field of narrative medicine, argues that “over the past 
decade, conventional bioethics has struggled to find its way among its 
chosen principles and has found itself too thin to really address actual 
values conflicts that arise in illness” (p. 27). Grounded in the idea that 
narrative shapes not only human communication, (e.g. Fisher, 1984) but 
also understanding of oneself (e.g. Eakin, 1999) and one’s world (e.g. 
Plummer, 1994), narrative has been seen to offer a more reflective, 
relational means of interacting with patients (Engel, et al., 2008).  
The diverse approaches to narrative ethics are primarily rooted in 
the notion of “listening to one’s story” as an ethical activity, but few of 
them display any amount of agreement on what shape this should take or 
in what direction it should go, especially as other, more deterministic 
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ethical frameworks such as principlism can still be used to identify moral 
action after the story has been told (Wilks, 2005). Indeed, there have been 
attempts to merge principlism with narrative (see McCarthy, 2003, for 
example) but these fail to appreciate the incommensurability of the 
underlying philosophies of each and while, with Wilks (2005), we accept 
the need to pay attention to the stories of service users (and others) we 
wish to establish deeper roots for a narrative ethics. It is our contention 
that a narrative ethics involves attention to two primary facets of all 
narratives: both the story as it is told and the way in which it is told, the 
said and the saying (see Newton, 1995; Baldwin, 2005). Furthermore, we 
assert that the service user and the social worker compose their narratives 
in relationship and dialogue with the other, both ultimately emerging with 
a co-constructed narrative that displays a marked responsibility to the 
Other (Parton & O’Byrne, 2000). This narrative, ethical relationship then 
guides all future action. 
 
Point of Departure: Narrative Analysis 
 
Perhaps one starting point is the recognition that any telling of a 
story is necessarily an ethical activity in and of itself as it always selective 
in its presentation of events, characterises people in a certain manner, and 
includes implicit value judgements as part of the very texture of the story 
(Chambers, 1999). In light of this, writers in both medicine and social 
work (Chambers, 1999; Hall, 1997; Urek, 2005) argue for the necessity of 
including a sort of literary analysis into any ethical endeavour starting 
with narratives. Such analysis might include attention to uses of language, 
plot, characterization, and other such hallmarks of literary form, all of 
which combine to affect the reader and promote specific views and 
beliefs of the author, or even portray the author in a certain light (see, for 
example, Baldwin 2011, on the rhetoric of expert reports in cases of child 
protection). It also points to an ethics of how we include other people in 
our stories, especially as our interpretations of their actions, beliefs, or 
stories may not accord with theirs—a persistent tension in social work 
practice committed both to the empowerment of the individual and the 
development of professional expertise. Narratives are always 
representations and constructions, and literary and narratological 
investigation points this out in no uncertain terms, including the fact that 
a particular narrative could have been composed in any number of ways 
(see Chambers & Montgomery, 1999, on the contingency of narrative).  
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Such literary analysis can also extend to institutional narratives—
those stories told by social workers about service users in assessments, 
team conferences, court reports, and other official documentation—which 
are not, and cannot be, innocent of ethical implication or of being caught 
up in stereotypical dramas. Hyden (1997) writes: 
  
The institutional narrative constitutes the social workers, 
psychiatrists, clients and patients as characters and their missions 
or destinies in an ongoing moral drama. Clients and patients are 
persons who succumb to their destiny because they have violated 
the moral order; the professionals are the representatives of the 
good, tragic, albeit still saviours, trying to prevent further 
violations. (p. 262) 
 
Hall (1997) reiterates the need to examine the texts and stories of social 
workers themselves when he says “Social worker as text, then, means 
approaching the conversations and reports of social workers as rhetorical, 
interactional and literary entities to be understood through an analysis of 
the reading practices of different readers” (p. 13). The stories of social 
workers turn into institutional narratives with great force and power to 
shape service user’s lives, but they are neither objective nor ethically non-
aligned. For example, all stories, those told by service users and social 
workers alike, contain accounts of other people and the tellers choose 
how they will describe those people as well as how they depict 
themselves (see Baldwin, 2004, on character work in cases of alleged 
Munchausen syndrome by proxy). Often, this takes on explicitly moral 
overtones in social worker stories: an “uncaring parent,” a “dedicated 
foster family,” or “unsuitable mother” (Urek, 2005). 
Along similar lines, one could also engage in an analysis not only 
of professional documents emerging from certain institutions, but also the 
ways in which structures, institutions, and discourses are portrayed as 
influential in a particular individual’s life. What may be called meta-
narratives—narratives with wide social and cultural influence—are 
pervasive and can be exceptionally damaging to those they marginalize or 
oppress (Nelson, 2001). Social work seeks to redress the ill effects of both 
oppressive structures and meta-narratives so it is crucial to see how such 
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A Philosophy for Narrative Ethics 
 
The approach to narrative ethics from a literary perspective focusing on 
the narrative itself provides one entry point, what Levinas might refer to 
as the “Said” (see Kearney, 1984); nevertheless, it ultimately needs 
further development to be a strong ethics for social work. We may have 
two stories—that of the social worker and the service user—and know 
what to look for in the construction and understanding of each, but 
narrative as a basis for future ethical interaction still requires more 
profound consideration, rooted in a philosophical understanding of the 
Self and the Other—an understanding missing from Wilks’ (2005) 
discussion—and of how the very “Saying” or telling of a narrative 
indicates a fundamental relationship of responsibility between teller and 
hearer, a telling which precludes the following of predetermined 
guidelines. 
Firstly, we must note that as narrative social work is primarily an 
ethical endeavour which embodies certain ways of relating to the Other 
(the service user), it requires not only the hearing, respecting, and 
understanding of service users’ stories but also an acknowledgement of, 
and respect for, the service user as a moral Other completely different 
from oneself, what Levinas (1961) calls alterity. In addressing this ethical 
relationship we turn both to Levinas (1961), who describes an ethics of 
relating to the Other, and MacIntyre (1984), who examines the narrative 
nature of the Self. 
Narrative as a crucial constituent of the Self has been noted by 
many authors (see, for example, Macintyre, 1984; Bruner 1987, 2006; 
Taylor, 1989; Schechtman, 1996). Indeed, such is the human propensity 
for telling stories that some authors refer to persons as homo narrans (see 
Fisher, 1984). The meeting of the Self and Other is thus saturated with 
ethical implication in two ways: first, in the Saying, the telling of one’s 
story, involving as it does self-disclosure and, consequently, the 
possibility for authenticity—it is “what makes the self-exposure of 
sincerity possible” (Kearney, 1984, p. 64); and second, in the ethical 
responsibility that emerges in both interpreting and acting upon the Said 
of the Other, vital corollaries of the dialogue that constitutes relationship. 
In other words, the Saying and the Said that occur through language and 
its consequent ethical dimensions are inextricably tied to narrative and 
thus, “Any ethic, whether social, political, legal or otherwise, involves 
narrative” (Fisher, 1984, p. 3). 
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As Levinas puts it, “Language as saying is an ethical openness to the 
other” (Kearney, 1984, p. 65) and thus, we would suggest, the basis for 
the social work relationship that seeks to empower service users through 
respect for “the distinct systems of beliefs and lifestyles of individuals, 
families, groups, communities without prejudice” (CASW, 2005, p. 3) 
To put this relationship between Self and Other in a different way, 
the vulnerable Other is in need of an ethical response from the Self, a 
response that requires careful attention to the position of both the Self and 
Other in the ethical relationship (in social work, and in other professional 
relationships, often a relationship of power). Such attention, and all future 
action, in turn, depends upon narrative as making possible and shaping 
this encounter in the first place. It also necessitates the realization that the 
Other is irreducibly different from the Self and that violence arises when 
one attempts to subsume the Other into oneself, one’s worldview, or 
one’s way of understanding. This, of course, demands that the Self 
jettison its self-interest and (professional) presumptions of power and 
temporarily relinquish its attendant beliefs, opinions, and worldviews, 
including one’s a priori moral principles, in order to be able to respond 
ethically. As Robbins (2000) puts it, “to reduce the Other who calls me as 
a unique self in the face-to-face to a set of a priori moral principles is a 
violence to her alterity.” Writing from a social work perspective, Rossiter 
(2011) states that this irreducible difference means that 
  
I must refrain from treating the other person as an extension of my 
categories, my theories, my habitual or learned ways of perceiving 
others. Indeed, I must refrain from seeing the person through any 
system of human thought because when I use my categories to 
“know” the other person, I treat him or her as an extension of my 
knowing. This, for Levinas, is violence—even symbolic murder. 
(p. 985) 
 
As MacIntyre (1984) rightly notes, narrative identity, and consequently 
narrative ethics, always implicate those around us: “For the story of my 
life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I 
derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off 
from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present 
relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession 
of a social identity coincide” (p. 221). This means that just as our identity 
is narratively constituted, so too does a narrative ethics implicate a social 
community. It is not isolable to Self and Other, but can—should—extend 
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to take into account the social, cultural, and historical contexts in which 
we reside—a central tenet of social work. To view the Other without 
consideration of context is to do violence to any attempt to understand the 
Other. It also means taking into consideration family relationships and 
stories, as well, something which proponents of narrative ethics in 
medicine point out: “it is wrong to consider only the well-being of one 
member of a family when the lives of the others will also be dramatically 
affected” (Hardwig, 1997, p. 59). This narrative, intersubjective identity 
aligns with and extends social work’s understanding that people exist in 
families and communities and that actions carried out in terms of 
individuals will necessarily affect the Other and vice versa. 
The realization that narrative establishes grounds for meeting the 
Other and therefore constitutes an ethical interaction with and reaction to 
that Other has certain implications for social work. If the Other is the 
service user and the Self the social worker, narrative ethics becomes a 
matter of responsibility to the Other/service user and of not doing 
violence to him or her; such an ethics circumvents the contextual aridity 
of principlism through its analytic attention to the personal, local, and 
structural aspects which emerge in any narrative. It also implies the 
practice of qualities which seek to support the goals and desires of the 
service user without forcing prescribed actions on him or her, imposing 
external categories and interpretations drawn from social work theory or 
elsewhere (see for example, the discussion of the client as a “talking 
problem” in Urek, 2004; the examination of the construction of the 
“unsuitable” mother in Urek, 2005; and the concept of unsettled social 
work in Rossiter, 2011), or privileging expert knowledge and/or the 
accounts of social work or other professions over those of the service user 
(see, for example, the asymmetry of approach toward evidence in the case 
of P,C,&S, described by Baldwin, 2004). All of these features strengthen 
a conception of social work based on caring for and empowering service 
users, and we now look at the possibilities of such practice for social 
work generally and the social worker/service user relationship 
particularly. 
 
Caring, Power, and Service User Agency 
 
In the Self/Other, social worker/service user relationship described 
above, components of each person’s narrative identity and ethical practice 
merge to create a new story shared by both social worker and service 
user. The ethical narrative that emerges is one that is based on mutuality 
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between, solidarity with, concern for uniqueness or alterity of, care for, 
and trust in the Other and is thus one much more suited to the values of 
social work than its current reliance on a principlist code of ethics based 
on Western assumptions and privileging expert theory over lay 
experience that turns the ethical encounter into a sub-set of decision-
making. Furthermore, in this give-and-take relationship of the social 
worker responding ethically to the story of the service user, the social 
worker is not erased or subsumed into the Other, as some might object. 
Rather, there is the recognition that both have an essential role to play in 
changing a situation and moving forward. Such a narrative ethics 
demonstrates, as well as strengthens, the caring foundation upon which 
social work is built and it provides a means of recovering the idea of 
caring for the Other through respecting and founding relationships upon 
respect for the narrative nature of the Self (see above). 
As McKnight (1995) argues in regard to a number of so-called 
“caring professions,” social work as one such profession is often 
criticized as having abdicated its main focus in favour of increasing 
professionalization and bureaucratization. One way to combat such 
professional apathy is to realize that in telling their stories to each other 
and then co-constructing a new story together, the service user and the 
social worker participate in a profoundly ethical activity far outstripping 
“just a story.” This co-construction, as a process framed by mutuality and 
equality, is illustrated by the work of Keady and Williams (2005; see also 
Williams and Keady, 2005) in co-constructed inquiry with people living 
with dementia. In contrast to much of current social work, in this process 
both offer up self-disclosure and self-exposure in their Saying, implicitly 
assuming responsibility for what the Other has Said. Relationality and 
dialogue with service users is thus a means to avoid doing grave violence 
to them.  
Caring, opened up by a narrative ethics which embraces the story 
of the service user and shows awareness of the elements that go into 
constructing it, becomes an orientation to the Other that recognizes the 
continuous, narrative nature of being by refusing to “fix” the service user 
into certain categories, does not silence him or her, and frees him or her to 
choose the paths he or she wishes to follow.  
Unlike MacIntyre’s argument that such paths should take the form 
of a single, coherent life narrative, the service user may articulate a 
number of potential stories for him- or herself, none of which may be 
particularly coherent in any traditionally conceived sense, but which 
nonetheless honours the user’s aspirations. In this, narrative can act to 
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resist the tendency toward templating (the tendency to check “the 
individual against a “social template; to see whether he or she fits a 
particular pattern” see Howitt, 1992, p. 123) and can generate “lines of 
flight” or complex, multiplicitous narratives that allow for the creative 
self-constitution on the part of service users (see Baldwin and Hill, 2012). 
This caring relationship therefore involves the crucial distinction 
of working with service users rather than on them—a distinction that most 
social workers would easily recognise. The power imbalance that 
characterizes conventional social worker/service user interactions is, if 
not neutralized, at least admitted by this Levinasian Other-focused 
narrative and the moral and agentic capacity can thus be engaged through 
attention to Plummer’s sociology of stories (Plummer, 1994). Plummer 
identifies five elements of such a sociology: the nature of stories, the 
production and consumption of stories, the strategies of story-telling, and 
the role and work of stories in the wider world. In paying attention to the 
nature of stories, we become aware of what kinds of narratives empower 
and which degrade, control, and dominate; which pathologize and which 
promote agency and transformation; and which marginalise, are given 
priority or attributed more credibility. In becoming aware of such 
narratives we can make ethical choices as to the form, content, and 
process that we want to engage in our work with service users. 
If we concern ourselves with the making or production of stories 
we are able to see how some voices are silenced, fragmented, disrupted 
through circumstances or relationships of power and how spaces can be 
created for stories through Levinasian Other-focused relationships and 
dialogue. Similarly, if we explore who has access to stories, who 
consumes stories, how the reader is located in social, cultural, and 
political spectra, we can identify what will be needed to expand the space 
in which stories can be told. For example, the movement towards 
increasing inclusion of service users in social work education and training 
can be seen as expanding the audience for such stories.  
Plummer’s fourth element concerns the strategies of storytelling, 
how some people might find it more difficult than others to tell their story 
and how interactions may help or hinder the telling of those stories. For 
example, Baldwin (2006) has explored issues of narrative dispossession 
amongst people with dementia and Booth and Booth (1996) have 
explored how to facilitate narrative with people with learning difficulties. 
Attention to the subtle and not-so-subtle ways by which we open up or 
shut down stories can help us work ethically with service users. Finally, 
Plummer discusses stories in the wider world, how stories sit within the 
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wider frameworks of power. These might include the meta-narratives that 
frame individual and group experience (see, for example, Nelson, 2001); 
issues of rhetoric by which some voices, such as those of professionals 
and experts, are heard more readily than others (see Plummer, 1994); the 
role of stories in promoting human rights and social justice (see Davis, 
2002); and the stories of those traditionally marginalized and oppressed. 
As bell hooks states: “Oppressed people resist by identifying themselves 
as subjects, by defining their reality, shaping their new identity, naming 
their history, telling their story” (quoted in Plummer, 1994, p. 30). 
These elements can be illustrated through an exploration of the 
presence and legitimacy of service user experiences, viewpoints, and 
knowledge in social work. While over the years there have been some 
improvements in some jurisdictions in this area, in the main, the inclusion 
of service users’ voices is relatively limited. Beresford strongly points out 
the effects of such a shortcoming on social work practice: “Including 
service users is part of the broader issue of addressing rather than 
reinforcing their restricted rights and citizenship.... Their exclusion is 
incompatible with values associated with both social work and social 
inclusion” (2000, p. 499). Wilks sees narrative ethics as correcting this 
situation, noting that, “Within social work ethics, the perspectives of 
service users are largely absent. Narrative approaches to ethics offer the 
possibility of a place for service users’ stories in ethics—a field of ethical 
discussion the parameters of which are not fixed by professionals” 
(Wilks, p. 1259). This participatory model of service user involvement 
can be extended to uncover and address serious policy and service 
deficiencies, with the goal of more inclusive, efficient service delivery: 
“The service user movement seems to be exposing the limitations of 
traditional, fragmented service categories for organising participation 
designed to promote strategic change” (Carr, 2004, p. v). Service users 
can thus be actively involved in claiming power and decision-making 
capacity through their story construction. Psychiatric service users’ 
movements, for example, have had tremendous success in countering the 
biomedical model of mental illness and carving a space for their survivor 
stories, thus challenging the power imbalance in conventional psychiatry 
(Kemp, 2009). 
Where narrative ethics takes up issues of power, it also supports 
respectful interaction with cultural difference. Cultural sensitivity—a 
growing concern for social workers in their daily practice (see, for 
example, the Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in Social Work, 
dedicated to such issues)—is also provided for by narrative ethics in that 
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its focus on assisting the Other and meeting hisor her needs does not 
depend on the imposition of a Western ethical framework like 
principlism. Instead, narrative ethics can celebrate that everyone has a 
different story and a different way of telling it. Contrary to the idea that 
for principles, one size fits all, narrative provides the means by which 
service users from different backgrounds may speak for themselves and 
their cultural communities without having forced on them the assumption 
that those principles necessarily fit with their cultural traditions, thus 
addressing Azmi’s (1997) criticism raised earlier.  
Narrative can therefore accommodate great diversity and 
multiplicity in terms of identities, goals, needs, desires, and contexts, and 
encourage mutuality, understanding, and personal accountability. It is an 
ethics predicated on a response (in the Levinasian understanding of the 
term) to the Other that does not attempt to subsume the Other into pre-
existing categories, and does not automatically privilege social work’s 
knowledge, interpretations and understandings, or narratives over those of 
the Other (see Adams, 2008 on the dangers of narrative privilege). This is 
the ethics that exists before practice and leads us towards what Rossiter 
calls “unsettled social work,” a social work that “gives up the fantasy of 
complete comprehension in favour of an orientation towards the 
revelation of the Other” (Rossiter, 2011 p, 994). Further, it is a response 
that extends personal responsibility to the Other and, as Treacher (2006) 
says, “involves the act of alterity which is giving up on oneself, giving 
one’s self over to the other, and this is characterised by conscientiousness, 
humility and sensibility” (p. 36). This is thus a responsibility far beyond 
the boundaries constructed by principlism or social work codes of 
practice. Stories are not usually told without some expectations of both an 
audience and an effect on that audience, and it is the response prompted 
by a particular narrative that is crucial to future ethical action. Realizing 
that both the Saying and the Said of narrative involve ethicality is a start, 
and we can further ground the idea of ethical response in a strong 




As with any ethical theory, narrative ethics is by no means 
immune to criticism. While we argue that narrative ethics provides a more 
caring alternative to principlism for social work, it does not prescribe any 
particular ethical route for practical action. This, Wilks notes, opens up 
narrative ethics to the criticism of being relativistic, as it depends largely 
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on individual application, situational vagaries, and an open-ended 
responsibility to the Other instead of clearly-defined moral principles (to 
contrast, see also Banks, 1998, for an argument in favour of ethics codes). 
However, we assert that the simplistic juggling of principles to be applied 
in a particular case relinquishes personal accountability, turns away from 
the true needs of the Other/service user, and does violence to individual 
and cultural uniqueness. In an explicitly moral sense, narrative ethics in 
social work practice opens up the possibility, as Nelson (2002) says, of 
 
see[ing] morality as a continual interpersonal task of becoming 
and remaining mutually intelligible. In this view, morality is 
something we all do together, in actual moral communities whose 
members express themselves and influence others by appealing to 
mutually recognized values and use those same values to refine 
understanding, extend consensus, and eliminate conflict. ( p. 46) 
  
Narrative ethics poses a means of not only examining service user stories 
for certain content—although that is one possibility—it offers a 
fundamental way of opening up and listening to the Other that 
necessitates a reaction grounded in the other person’s best interests, not 
what we think those best interests should be (see for example, the 
discussion of blood transfusion in Paulsen, 2011, as an example of such 
narrative analysis and reasoning). As such, we suggest that codes of 
ethics might be restructured around the development of narrative literacy, 
addressing the narrative process and environment of social work practice. 
This means, in Nelson’s words, “it is time to tell the story forward” 
(2002, p. 45) and co-construct a new narrative that does justice to the 
many complex factors involved in a service user/social worker 
relationship, while at the same time respecting the personal and 
professional needs of both. This will require creative ethical thinking and 
a great deal of personal responsibility, but we see this as part and parcel 
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